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ABSTRACT This article constitutes one of the ﬁrst comparisons between the philosophies
of Peter Sloterdijk and the philosophical tandem Gilles Deleuze-Félix Guattari. Subject of the
discussion between both philosophical positions is how the communication with the exterior,
and thus also how an interiority is to be conceived. Both philosophers raise these questions in
reference to the work of the Estonian biologist Jacob von Uexküll. At ﬁrst sight, Sloterdijk’s
focus on immunity mechanisms seems to suggest a preference for restricting this commu-
nication, whereas Deleuze and Guattari’s interest in becomings seems to direct us in the
opposite direction. However, a closer examination of both positions reveals that the differ-
ence lies in the nature of their approaches: whereas Deleuze and Guattari’s interest in
opening up interiorities is ontologically motivated, Sloterdijk’s focus on shielding them off is
existential. These ﬁndings might help us in demining the opposition between progressive
socialism and conservatism. This article is published as part of a collection on interiorities.
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Introduction
One of the philosophical authors that immediately comesto mind in the context of interiority and its link with thenotion of the interior is the German philosopher Peter
Sloterdijk. Between 1998 and 2004, Sloterdijk authored the trilogy
Spheres, in which he examines the history of western civilization
through the image of the bubble (the title of the ﬁrst volume) and
the globe (the title of the second volume; the third volume is titled
foam, a mass of bubbles). In these books, Sloterdijk is able to
connect phenomena as diverse as religious conceptions of the
universe, greenhouses and spaceships, because in each of them he
detects a movement of delimitation or shielding off that allows for
the construction of something within these limits: the interior is
the condition for an interiority.
One of Sloterdijk’s sources of inspiration for the trilogy is the
work of Estonian biologist Jacob von Uexküll and more
speciﬁcally his notion of Umwelt. Uexküll also happens to be of
great signiﬁcance to the philosophical tandem Gilles Deleuze and
Félix Guattari. The latter are usually subsumed under the heading
of poststructuralism, a “school” in continental philosophy that
originated in the sixties of the previous century and ended
somewhere at the end of it. Other poststructuralist authors
include Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes and
Julia Kristeva.
However, Deleuze and Guattari appear to make different use of
Uexküll’s insights than Sloterdijk: instead of stressing the
necessity of a delimitating movement, they focus on the
interactive character of Umwelt or, rather, on the fact that it
includes a dialogue between parts of entities and thus presupposes
a movement of opening up pre-established entities. Is this
observation correct? And if so, does this difference in focus reﬂect
a more general difference of nature between poststructuralism
and the philosophies that came to succeed it? Is it, for example, an
illustration of the revolutionary nature of poststructuralism
(decentering, destabilizing, desubjectivization) versus the more
pragmatic stance of the philosophers that work with the legacy of
poststructuralism?
It will become clear that, in both Deleuze and Guattari’s as well
as Sloterdijk’s philosophies, there are elements to be distinguished
that undermine or, at least, nuance this observation. With respect
to Deleuze and Guattari, we can refer to the notions of
“armature” (Francis Bacon. The logic of sensation) and “house”
(What is Philosophy?). To nuance the characterization of
Sloterdijk’s philosophy, we will look at the multiple and
transformative nature of his interiorities, the aspects that prevent
these interiorities from turning into absolute interiorities that no
longer need an outside. In the ﬁnal part of this article, we will
reassemble all the arguments and try to determine what might
constitute the difference between a Deleuzo-Guattarian interiority
and a Sloterdijkian interiority.
Sloterdijk’s notion of the bubble presupposes a movement of
closure. Sloterdijk’s notion of the bubble is inspired by Uexküll’s
notion of Umwelt. Who is this biologist and what does Umwelt
refer to?
Jacob von Uexküll is known for having introduced a new
school in theoretical biology: ethology. In contrast to the
taxonomic approach of classical theoretical biology, which
consists in studying living organisms according to their lineage
and shared features, Uexküll believes one cannot know the
organism without observing how it relates to its environment. A
living organism is ﬁrst of all deﬁned by the speciﬁc relationship it
maintains with its environment, rather than by its speciﬁc
corporeal features. Instead of departing from a human point of
view, Uexküll thus tries to look through the eyes of the organisms
themselves: how do they see the world? What part of the world is
meaningful to them? What does this tell us about the organism
itself? What counts is thus less what organisms are, but more
where they are and how they are; that is, how they interact with
the environment in which they are living. According to Uexküll,
organisms do not merely occupy an environment, they create it.
Their relation to the environment is not a given, but is in constant
development. Uexküll thus exchanges the static and passive view
of taxonomic biology for one that is dynamic and creative. This
development does not occur solely on account of the animal: it is
not the case that the animal is merely shaping its environment,
but that the animal is likewise shaped by its environment. Animal
and environment encounter each other in a contrapuntal
relationship of reciprocal determination, the “animal is produced
by the production of a milieu” as Merleau-Ponty describes
Uexküll’s thesis (Merleau-Ponty, 2003: 173); the animal is thus a
product, an effect of something it has produced itself. Animal and
environment make up an indivisible biological unity: an Umwelt
or milieu.1
In his foreword to A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and
Men, Uexküll proposes that we consider Umwelt, the composite
unity of the living organism and its environment, as a soap
bubble: “The best way to begin this stroll is to set out on a sunny
day through a ﬂower-strewn meadow that is humming with
insects and ﬂuttering with butterﬂies, and build around every
animal a soap bubble (Seifenblase) to represent its own
environment (Umwelt) that is ﬁlled with the perceptions
accessible to that subject alone. As soon as we ourselves step
into one of these bubbles, the surrounding meadow (Umgebung)
is completely transformed. Many of its colourful features
disappear, others no longer belong together, new relationships
are created. A new world emerges in each bubble.” (von Uexküll,
1957: 5)
The metaphor of the soap bubble suggests that the world with
which the living organism interacts is limited.2 Its limits are not
so much determined by the physical limitations of the living
organism (in the sense that, for instance, the world of a goldﬁsh
does not comprise the air because the goldﬁsh does not possess
lungs) but instead, these limits are determined by the way in
which the living organism addresses the world. Umwelt refers to
the world only insofar as it interests the organism: “The Umwelt
forms a ﬁgurative perimeter around the organism, “inside” of
which certain things are signiﬁcant and meaningful, and
“outside” of which other things are as good as nonexistent
insofar as they are ‘hidden in inﬁnity’” (Buchanan, 2008: 23–24).
As a consequence, there are as many Umwelts as there are living
organisms. As Sloterdijk remarks, Uexküll’s idea implies a
shattering of “monological metaphysics, which explains the
world as monocontext and projects it onto a single eye”
replacing it with a “pluralistic ontology which introduces so
many worlds […] without having recourse to the hypostasis of an
eye of all eyes […].” (Sloterdijk, 2004: 248–249). Moreover,
Uexküll clearly exchanges a mechanistic account of nature for one
that is intentional or expressive. Of course this appeal of the living
organism towards the world can only happen if the organism has
the right physical features (an animal can only address the world
in its liquid form if it possesses the physical capacity to extract
oxygen from the water), but this does not imply that the physical
features of the organism are the ﬁrst and only ground from which
to explain Umwelt. Contrary to Darwin, Uexküll does not want to
reduce the examination of the unity of Umwelt to an examination
of the physical correspondences between living organism and its
environment (for example, animals with a thick fur in cold
environments). Instead, he wants to open it up to an examination
of how the living organism and its environment relate through
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their ways of behaving and perceiving—that is, their rhythmic
postures, sounds or colours.3
Sloterdijk takes over Uexküll’s idea of living organisms being
deﬁned by the way they address their environment: “(...) living is
always already living in an Umwelt—and thus also against an
Umwelt and in opposition with several exterior Umwelts-, […].4
With respect to the human organism, Sloterdijk follows Heidegger:
he considers the human being an ecstatic creature—that is, a
creature whose being consists of being always already outside of
itself. The outside, however, is threatening, or at least
uncontrollable and untrustworthy. To guard against it, man
creates a membrane that shields him from this outside. The
membrane enables him to appropriate everything within it, thus
recreating an interior. Because of this double movement of, on the
one hand, shielding and expulsion, and on the other hand, the
creation of an interior, Sloterdijk calls a sphere an ‘‘'inclusive
exclusivity’’,5 which results in an immunity, or a resistance against
what is outside. Like Uexküll, Sloterdijk’s conception of the
integrity of an organism and its Umwelt relies on the membrane,
which can be considered the principle of this inclusive exclusivity.
According to Sloterdijk, the ﬁrst bubble in which man ﬁnds
himself is the uterus. Mother and child form a two-unity that is
shattered once the baby is born, or at least threatened by other
persons and activities that take up his mother’s time. From the
moment individuals cease to be poles in a two-unity and
participate in a multipolar space, a crisis arises (Sloterdijk, 2011:
54) and the outside presents itself in all its destabilizing force.
What follows is a process of “world condensation”,6 of trying to
incorporate the strange, the accidental and the exterior.
An attempt is made to create an order by transferring the
interior onto the exterior (Sloterdijk, 2011: 56).7 In Sloterdijk’s
view, the history of civilization is one of ever-expanding spheres,
of constructing circles that include more of the outside: from the
tribe to the people, from the village to the town and the nation-
state, from the landlord to the political party, and so on.
The historical highlights of this evolution are metaphysical and
theological monocentric constructs. Today, these have been
torn down. Or rather, they have collapsed under the aporetic
tension between community and immunity, and once their
expansion crosses a critical threshold, they acquire an auto-
immune deﬁciency. The all-embracing sphere has exploded, or
imploded, depending on your perspective.
Sloterdijk claims, and here he is following Heidegger as well
(Sloterdijk, 2011: 333–342), that this shielding is vital for man:
“They (humans) ﬂourish only in the greenhouse of their
autogenous atmosphere.” (Sloterdijk, 2011: 46). There is no such
thing as human life in the state of nature, naked and alone. To
reproduce and individuate himself, man needs a place that is
familiar and that he shares with other people or other things.
Coexistence precedes and conditions existence. This does not mean
that man is the one instigating and controlling this process of
sphere construction. It is rather a self-organizing process
(Sloterdijk, 2011: 79); the bubble is created by the inspiration or
animation that is common to the inhabitants of the sphere—
subjects and objects!—, and that causes them to address one
another such as to create a shared space of experience (Sloterdijk,
2011: 45). Contrary to Kant, who considers space to be the
condition of possibility of a sensus communis, Sloterdijk reverses
this relation: the being-together conditions the creation of a space.
Moreover, this movement of closure, of folding into oneself, is
not only primary for anthropogenesis but for the genesis of every
kind of living organism. Life begins under a form of interiority.
An organism comes to be in and through these delimiting,
identifying movements. Identity or self-reference is the result of
an initial cell membrane: skin, feathers, a cave, a city wall, a witch
circle, a symbolic structure, and so on.
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of multiplicity presupposes a
movement of opening up. Deleuze and Guattari adhere to
Uexküll’s idea that the living organism and its environment form
a dynamic and expressive unity whose origin cannot be relegated
to either one or the other. However, Deleuze and Guattari’s
relational conception of the living organism slightly differs from
Uexküll’s in the sense that they consider the relation between
organism and environment to be a relationship of affects, rather
than a relationship between bodies.8 They read Uexküll in a
Spinozistic manner. Why? “Affect” is a central notion in
Spinoza’s Ethics. In contrast to an affection (affectio), which
“refers to a state of the affected body and implies the presence of
the affecting body”, an affect (affectus) “refers to the passage from
one state to another, taking into account the correlative variation
of the affecting bodies” (Deleuze, 1988: 49). An affect thus
indicates ﬁrst of all a relation or a transition and not merely the
state of a body. However, other than Spinoza—who still includes
the organic unity of the body in his deﬁnition of the affect—,
Deleuze and Guattari completely drop the unitary frame of
reference that is the organism. An affect is, as they call it, a “pure
becoming” because it refers to the passage between different
bodies, between different states of one body, or between parts of
different bodies. One of Deleuze and Guattari’s preferred
examples of such an affecting relation is the relation between
an orchid and a wasp. They describe it as a “love relationship”,
thereby indicating a contrast with a Spencerian conception of
nature in terms of struggle and competition. According to
Deleuze and Guattari, the orchid-wasp relation does not imply a
collaboration in the sense of the orchid providing nectar for the
wasp and the wasp simultaneously helping with the reproduction
of the ﬂower. Rather, we are dealing with a new functional unity
which does not include the orchid or the wasp, but only some of
their parts. These are the reproductive organ of the wasp and the
feature of the orchid that resembles the protrusion of the female
wasp: some orchids seduce male wasps by imitating this
protrusion, even to the degree of bringing the male wasp to
orgasm. These parts are hence detached from the entities to
which they are supposed to belong and constitute a new machinic
assemblage. Deleuze and Guattari write that the wasp is a
“liberated piece of the orchid’s reproductive system” and the
orchid, “the object of an orgasm in the wasp, also liberated from
its own reproduction” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 324).
The affecting-affective-relationship characterizing Umwelt thus
implies a deterritorialization, a breaking of “natural” or “original”
boundaries, a crumbling of identities in a collective becoming.
This “becoming is not a correspondence between relations”, as
Darwinism states, and neither is it “a resemblance, an imitation,
or, at the limit, an identiﬁcation”, like the everyday meaning of
the word “becoming” suggests (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 262).
Rather, it is something that takes place beneath the level of
identities. For example, in order for the orchid-wasp collabora-
tion to work, the orchid has to become wasp-like and vice versa.
But these becomings do not presuppose that the changed orchid
and the wasp will have some characteristics in common. Instead,
both terms of the relation change. We can explain this by
referring to another example used by Deleuze and Guattari, that
of the bird Scenopoïetes dentirostris. This bird plucks leaves from
the trees and places them upside down, with their white
underside towards the sky, so as to create a contrast with the
brown soil. The soil and the leaves arranged by the bird form a
new unity, a piece of art according to Deleuze and Guattari. This
unity cannot be reduced to a combination of bird and soil: it can
neither be reduced to a reaction of the bird to its environment
(scarcity of the females that need to be seduced by all possible
means, for example), nor to an interaction of bird and
environment (in the sense that bird and environment shape each
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other). The reason is that this new unity consists of elements that
did not exist before. Before the bird starts turning leaves, neither
the bird-artist nor the soil-canvas exist.
Beside the notion of becoming, Deleuze and Guattari use
another concept to express their politics of cracking identities:
multiplicity. Every living being is a multiplicity.9 In contrast to
identities that are indivisible, multiplicities are composed of
heterogeneous elements. Furthermore, they are intensities, as
being opposed to extensive unities. Extensive unities have the
property of being partes extra partes, they are the sum of
subentities that are all of the same nature. An extensive unity is
cardinal. A dozen, for example, is the sum of 12 identical unities,
namely 12 “ones”. A crate of beer is the collection of 24 identical
bottles of beer. An intensity, by contrast, cannot be subdivided
into homogeneous elements. A temperature or a speed, for
instance, is not composed of other temperatures or speeds. The
cardinal translation of a temperature (25 °C) is, but the warmth of
a nice sunny afternoon in August is not: a nice sunny afternoon
in August is not the sum of four cold afternoons in January. An
intensity is determined by an asymmetrical relation between
heterogeneous elements: the absence of wind and a high humidity
level are decisive for how warm it feels. Moreover, the
composition of an intensity cannot be changed without the
nature of the intensity changing. When I take away half of the
bottles in a crate of beer, the quantity has diminished but the
quality has remained the same. When the temperature drops by
50%, on the other hand, it is no longer a warm sunny afternoon.
Thus, a multiplicity consists of different qualities folded into one
another, while simultaneously being irreducible to one another.
Whether Deleuze and Guattari describe living organisms
in terms of affects, becomings or multiplicities, what remains
constant in these notions is the movement of breaking interi-
orities and opening them onto other forces, elements or aspects.
The ultimate aim of Deleuze and Guattari seems to be the making
of connections in such a way that what is connected does not
form a unity in which differences are annihilated. As Brett
Buchanan observes, “with Deleuze and Guattari, […], the soap
bubble has burst” (Buchanan, 2008: 175).
Intermediary conclusion. So far, the difference between the
thinking of Deleuze and Guattari, on the one hand, and Slo-
terdijk, on the other, appears to be the following: whereas the ﬁrst
believe in the generative qualities of the encounter with the
exterior, the latter focuses more on the importance of closing off
and selectively refusing participation. Instead of experimenting
with all sorts of possible connections with what does not belong
to an identity, Sloterdijk starts from the immunitary interests of
particular beings. “By nature, life only comes out well in the
ﬁnitude of an individualized immune system”.10 There is a
primacy of shielding above participation (Sloterdijk, 2004: 196).
Another, maybe less polemic, way of describing the contrast
between both philosophies is to say that Sloterdijk’s spherology is
motivated by an interest in spatializing the phenomenological
description of Umwelt, whereas Deleuze and Guattari’s approach
(especially Deleuze’s) seems to be fundamentally temporal. For
example, Sloterdijk presents his concept of bubble as an
alternative to the “anorectic” notion of a network: contrary to
the nodes of a network, bubbles are “incompressible” occupations
of space (Sloterdijk, 2005: 391–406). Deleuze and Guattari’s
rhizomatic network philosophy, on the contrary, stresses the
nomadic aspect of Umwelt, its constant metamorphosis. They are
interested in how bubbles will morph into other bubbles and
generate new functional relations and immune systems. They are
interested in the expressive qualities of bubbles, rather than in
their possessive ones.11
However, despite this difference in focus, each of the
aforementioned philosophies also contains ideas and notions
that link with their so-called opposite. In Deleuze and Guattari,
we can ﬁnd elements that reveal an interest in closure and, vice
versa, there are also poststructuralist elements of breaking down
identities to be found in Sloterdijk.
Closing movements in Deleuze and Guattari
In his brilliant discussion of Francis Bacon’s paintings, Francis
Bacon. The logic of sensation, Deleuze uses two notions that are of
interest to us: “armature” (armature) and “frame” (charpente). As
they are closely related to the notion of “house” that Deleuze and
Guattari use in What is Philosophy? to talk about art and the art
of animals, we consider it legitimate to use them in a context
larger than the art of Francis Bacon alone. Let us ﬁrst see what
“armature” and “frame” mean in Bacon’s paintings, after which
we can extrapolate their signiﬁcance.
Deleuze claims that every painting by Bacon contains three
elements: ﬁrst, the Figure—which he also calls the body or the
head—, second, the armature—also known as the ﬁeld (aplat) or
material structure—, and ﬁnally the ring (la piste)—also described
as the round area (le rond) or the contour. The Figure refers not
to the main character of the representation, but to the (part of
the) body presented: Bacon wants to break narration and
representation and create a non-resembling resemblance with
reality, a presence. The Figure is a subject without identity and
without a place in the story. It always escapes itself. It is always
free falling. However, to prevent the Figure from actually
disappearing, it is contained ﬁrst by a small ring or round area,
then by a larger monochrome ﬁeld. This ﬁeld or armature cannot
be considered the background of the Figure: Bacon exchanges a
classical relation of ﬁgure and ground—of depth, in other words
—for a haptic or shallow depth. The ﬁeld surrounds the Figure,
rather than being placed behind the Figure. The contour is the
membrane through which armature and Figure communicate.
According to Deleuze, the armature has a structuring and
spatializing function. It divides the space, creates sections and
regions, for example, by varying the intensity or saturation of the
coloured ﬁeld and by introducing bars or ribbons. The goal of the
armature is to prevent the destabilizing forces of the Figure from
spreading out to the whole painting, to prevent colours from
mixing into a dead grey and planes from stumbling over one
another. However, the painter must be careful not to exaggerate
this structuring function such that he ends up with the rigid and
clichéd structure of representation. Deleuze calls Bacon’s art of
keeping this fragile balance the “diagram”.
When Deleuze discusses Bacon’s diagram, he distinguishes a
pair of forces that is very similar to the function of the Figure and
the armature: the sensation and the frame (charpente). When
making his paintings, Bacon cannot only rely upon sensations or
the ways in which his nervous system is directly affected by
colours and forms. Sensations are “ephemeral and confused,
lacking duration and clarity” (Deleuze, 2005: 79). To give them a
structure that can hold them and force them to take shape, he
needs the frame. The frame alone, however, is useless because it is
too abstract. The sensations allow the frame to be concrete, to be
felt (Deleuze, 2005: 79). In sum, whether Deleuze analyses
Bacon’s paintings or Bacon’s working method, he always ﬁnds the
same pair of forces: on the one hand, the force that breaks down
recognizable entities (identities, narrative structures, causalities,
and so on.) and allows them to be invaded by foreign elements—
the so-called deterritorializing forces—and on the other hand, the
forces that try to consolidate and structure the new connections
that are being made (without, however, ending up with a cliché)
—the so-called reterritorializing forces.12
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In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari call the two
forces present in every art work, the “house” (maison) and the
“cosmos” or the “universe” (cosmos, univers). “Now, what deﬁnes
the house are “sections,” that is to say, the pieces of differently
oriented planes that provide ﬂesh with its framework (armature):
foreground and background, horizontal and vertical sections, left
and right, straight and oblique, rectilinear and curved” (Deleuze
and Guattari, 2003: 179). The “house” is thus what was called the
“armature” in Francis Bacon. The logic of sensation, it is the
territorializing force. The house protects us from the cosmos or
the deterritorializing forces, though it can never completely keep
them outside: “at most it ﬁlters and selects them. (…) But equally,
the most baleful forces can come in through the half-open or half-
closed door (…)” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2003: 182). The
universe, on the other hand, “supports” the house (Deleuze and
Guattari, 2003: 180) in the sense that it consists of the insensible
forces that traverse the world and constitute it. Despite Deleuze
and Guattari clearly indicating that an art work requires both
forces, the fact that they claim that architecture is the ﬁrst of the
arts (Deleuze and Guattari, 2003: 186) testiﬁes how important
they consider the territorializing force to be. “The most scientiﬁc
architecture endlessly produces and joins up frames and sections”
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2003: 186). They also refer to the care and
respect that is implied in the reterritorializing activity (Deleuze
and Guattari, 2003: 179): one recognizes a great artist not by the
violence with which he destroys and opens up existing structures,
but by the care he gives to structuring what has been
deterritorialized.
Opening movements in Sloterdijk. According to Sloterdijk,
every sphere—that is: every construction as a shield against the
outside—consists of at least two poles. An example of a bipolar
sphere is the unity of mother and child in utero, but there are also
multi-poled bubbles like the intimate group sessions of animal
magnetism that Sloterdijk describes in his novel The Magic Tree.
This observation implies, ﬁrst, that the inner space is never pure;
it is always the conjunction of the proper or the interior with the
non-proper or the exterior (Sloterdijk, 2004: 536–537). A sphere
is always heterogeneous; it is a multiplicity without a ﬁrst or
primary pole. The poles are “originally complementary”. Second,
it means that the attacks from the outside not only threaten the
inner space, but also strengthen it and even form its condition of
possibility (Sloterdijk, 2011: 45–46). A bubble is what it is capable
of becoming, insofar as it is already the other that it becomes in
the mutually constitutive relation.
Moreover, although bubbles are shielded from the outside, they
are always communicating with it. They are not self-concealed
and isolated but reach out for accompaniment and overlap.
Sloterdijk proposes that we think of this communication in terms
of foam. In a physical way, foam refers to the product achieved
when inserting air into liquid (as in beer foam) or into ﬁrm
matter (as in lava rock). This entity, halfway between a liquid and
a solid, is constituted by multiple cells, each separated by
membranous partitions. The cells can invade their neighbours
and transmit their volume to them. Foam is stable—that is, cells
stop invading one another—when the tension is well spread
among all the bubbles, when the different bubbles have reached
an optimal interdependency. In contrast to classical entities, the
unity of the foam is thus not determined by something identical
or indivisible, but by a difference (in tension or in intensity). This
is clearly a very Deleuzian idea.
In general, we can say that Sloterdijk’s foam theory is intended
to turn upside down the classical thinking in terms of substances,
just as Deleuze is trying to invert Platonism. Instead of focusing
on what is indivisible, what exists in and of itself and what is
unchangeable, Sloterdijk’s foam is heterogeneous, outside of itself
and thus always in transformation. Its ephemeral nature—the fact
that air or nothingness is a fundamental part of foam and thus
that it is “almost nothing”, that “its presence is constituted by
absence” (Sloterdijk, 2004: 32–34)—contrasts with the solid
nature of classical, Platonic forms that are the acme of presence.
Moreover, in contrast to the unidirectional nature of the
substance—a substance conducts, founds or creates–, foams are
“two-way systems” (Sloterdijk, 2011: 41) in which no origin can
be discerned. In sum, with his notion of foam, Sloterdijk gives the
volatile, the insigniﬁcant and the secondary, the attention that
used to be preserved for the ever-being, the substantial and the
primary. “That which has been treated in a step-motherly way for
centuries, a seemingly frivolous surplus of existence, […], will
now regain its share in the deﬁnition of the real. Then one will
understand that the ﬂoating can serve as a special kind of
foundation, that the hollow can be described as an autonomous
fullness, that the fragile can be considered the place and mode of
the most real, that the unrepeatable is a phenomenon of a higher
order than the serial.”13
The heterogeneous nature of the bubble, the differential nature
of the foam and the re-evaluation of the empty can all be
considered afﬁrmations of the constitutive power of the move-
ment of opening up, and thus complements Sloterdijk’s initial
founding movement of closure.
Conclusion
Now that we have given counterarguments to the hypothesis that
the primary movement in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is
one of opening up, whereas Sloterdijk’s thinking is primarily
characterized by closure, we have to reconsider the question of
the difference between these thinkers. The hypothesis of a
contradiction can be discarded, not only because there is textual
proof that connects each position with its opposite, but also, and
more importantly, because a closer look indicates that these
positions do not necessarily present opposite ends of one and the
same line. We would like to propose the idea that Deleuze and
Guattari’s observations are situated on an ontological level,
whereas Sloterdijk’s focus is existential. To explain this, we must
examine the nature of the communication with the outside in
each of the positions.
Sloterdijk’s image of the foam suggests that the communication
between bubbles is indirect and, more importantly, unintended. It
is a by-product of the way bubbles are constituted. In foam, one
and the same partition does not only mark the end of one bubble
but also the beginning of the next. Bubbles are at the same time
separated from and connected to each other. They coexist as
separate entities—Sloterdijk uses the term “co-isolation”—and
this co-isolation is the actual agent of the formation of space.14
This means that movements within one bubble necessarily have
implications for the surrounding bubbles. If one bubble expands,
this will make the neighbouring bubbles shrink, except if these
neighbours also swell and force their neighbours to shrink. Foam,
then, is the result of this indirect communication between
bubbles.
In Deleuze and Guattari, on the contrary, the communication
with the outside is not a by-product but a mission. It is not an
unintended consequence but a goal we must aim at. We have to
tear down the tired ideas of what it is to be human and allow
ourselves to let animal traits trickle into our self-image (the so-
called becoming-animal or becoming-molecular). We have to
leave the known paths of how things are being said and
start stammering (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 109). Or as Isabelle
Stengers has pointed out, Anti-Oedipus contains an accelera-
tionist categorical imperative to deterritorialize and destroy
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everything that reeks of sedentariness (Stengers, 2009: 265–266).
In other words, we should be open to any kind of exterior that
shakes the boundaries and layers of territories.
Some scholars think this moral prescription (we have to) is in
contradiction with the amoral essence of Deleuze and Guattari’s
philosophy. Since Deleuze and Guattari do not accept any
authority, they cannot prescribe any kind of behaviour. This is
true. However, in this situation, it is not some kind of authority
that commands this behaviour, but life itself. Deleuze and
Guattari can plea for deterritorialization not because it is valuable
in itself, not because it is a principle (like moral values), but
because it is a condition for life; without these deterritorializa-
tions, life becomes ossiﬁed and dies out. So, while one must
pursue communication with the outside, this occurs as an
ontological necessity and not a moral imperative.
Sloterdijk, on the contrary, observes that we should not always
be hospitable in facing the exterior (Sloterdijk, 2011: 75). Not only
should we accept that there will always be something of the
exterior that will remain exterior,15 it should also be like this.
Exclusivity, ﬂaws in the communication with the other, and
negation (as it is implied in the exclusion of sheer exteriority from
Umwelt) are afﬁrmative virtues.16 Why is this? Why are we not
allowed to incorporate exteriority completely, even if we would be
capable of doing it? According to Sloterdijk, one must defend
one’s “antagonistic” interests (Sloterdijk, 2004: 195) because one
can only welcome other selves when the inner space that allows
for the construction of one’s self is taken care of. The construction
of the inner space presupposes a kind of naiveté with respect to
the exterior—he calls it “reimplication” (Sloterdijk, 2004: 202)—
which does not mean that the exterior is ignored but that one has
the freedom not to take into account certain parts of this exterior.
To conclude: Sloterdijk’s position with respect to interiority
differs from Deleuze and Guattari’s not because their ontological
insights diverge—on the contrary, Sloterdijk recognizes the
ontological necessity of all kinds of movements that open up
interiorities (heterogenesis, multiplicities, transformation, poros-
ity, etc.),—, but because he draws attention to the existential
difﬁculties associated with these movements. This difference
cannot be reduced to the mere opposition between conservatism
and progressive socialism because—as Isabelle Stengers observes
(Stengers, 2003: 372)—the fascination for change and difference
might be the acme of tolerance but it is also the cause of
irrecoverable damage.
Notes
1 Because this concept has been translated in various ways, not only in the English
translations of Uexküll’s work (now as ‘‘environment’’, then as “milieu”), but also in
the English translations of authors that have employed this concept (such as Slo-
terdijk, Merleau-Ponty, and so on.), we prefer to use the original German term.
2 “The space peculiar to each animal, wherever that animal may be, can be compared
with a soap bubble which completely surrounds the creature at a greater or less
distance. The extended soap bubble constitutes the limit of what is ﬁnite for the
animal, and therewith the limit of its world; what lies behind that is hidden in
inﬁnity.” (von Uexküll, 1927: 42)
3 As an example of an Umwelt, we can refer to the world with which the tick forms a
unity. The Umwelt of a tick is reduced to three dimensions: light, odor and warmth.
Light, which the tick perceives with its photoreceptive skin, guides the tick towards
the top of a branch. Odor (of the butyric gland of mammals) makes the tick release
itself from the branch and fall onto the back of the mammal passing underneath the
tree. And warmth leads the tick towards the least furry spot on the mammal’s body,
where it can enter the skin and suck blood. Everything else in the tick’s external
surroundings is without signiﬁcance for the tick: the weather, the presence of non-
mammals, the type of mammal, sounds, and so on. The Umwelt of a medusa is even
more restricted than that of the tick: a medusa can hardly be said to address the world
as its behavior has almost no relation to the environment. The only thing a medusa
does is breathe oxygen, move about and open its digestive tube. But as these actions
never change according to external circumstances—the passing of an edible substance
will not, for instance, affect the opening of the digestive tube, it opens at random—it
almost does not have an environment. As we move up the hierarchy of animals, the
size of the soap bubble will increase or, to say it differently, the world will be
addressed in a more differentiated way. In contrast to a tick, the world of a dog
contains living beings that are not immediately relevant for its food supply (namely
those who threaten its existence or those it can play with), in a dog’s world there is a
distinction between sunny and rainy weather (in the last case it will look for shelter,
whereas in the ﬁrst it will sunbathe), and so on.
4 “Finding that living is always already living in an Umwelt—and thus also against an
Umwelt and in opposition with several exterior Umwelts-, […]” (“ Mit der Fes-
tstellung, dass Leben immer schon Leben in einer Umwelt ist—und somit auch gegen
eine Umwelt und in Oppositionen zu vielen fremden Umwelten -, […]”, Sloterdijk,
2004: 193–194; translation modiﬁed)
5 “Immunity, as local aseity, originates from the praxis of good limitation—it is the
limit case of inclusive exclusivity.” (“Immunität, als lokale Aseität, entspringt der
Praxis guter Limitierung—sie ist der Ernstfall von inklusiver Exklusivität”, Sloterdijk,
2004: 538).
6 The German verb “dichten” from which the term “(Welt)dichtung” is deduced, has
the double meaning of, on the one hand, to ﬁll or to plug (a hole in a sock, for
example), and on the other hand, of poetry. The noun “Dichte” means density. The
English translation of Weltdichtung, “world literature” (Sloterdijk, 2011: 56), neglects
the ﬁrst meaning of dichten, which is, in the context of the process of incorporation
that Sloterdijk describes, the most important one. This is the reason why we decided
to deviate from Hoban’s translation and choose our own: “world condensation”.
7 In this context, Sloterdijk refers to Le Corbusier’s words “The exterior is the result of
an interior” (“Das Aussen ist das Ergebnis eines Innen”- Sloterdijk, 2004: 65).
8 “You will deﬁne an animal, or a human being, not by its form, its organs, and its
functions, and not as a subject either; you will deﬁne it by the affects of which it is
capable” (Deleuze, 1988: 124).
9 See also: “Every animal is fundamentally a band, a pack”, “a population” or “a
peopling” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 264).
10 “It (classical metaphysics) breaks up in the attempt to defend the case of life, which by
nature only comes out well in the ﬁnity of an individuated immune system, […].”
(“Sie (die klassische Metaphysik) zerbricht daran, dass sie die Sache des Lebens
verteidigen will, das naturgemäss nur in der Endlichkeit eines individuierten
Immunsystems aufgehoben ist, […]”, Sloterdijk, 2004: 19).
11 This could maybe explain why Deleuze and Guattari never thematize the concept of
Umwelt as such, unlike phenomenologists such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and
Sloterdijk. Deleuze and Guattari are not so much interested in the being-in-the-
world, in the nature of the space that man arranges for himself and by which he is
arranged, that he possesses and by which he is possessed, but in the becoming of the
world, in the evolution of this bidirectional process. (Buchanan, 2008: 176–177, 189).
12 Deleuze distinguishes these two forces also within the Figure: ﬂesh and bones
(Deleuze, 2005: 23).
13 “Das weltalterlang Verächtlich-Gemachte, das scheinbar Frivole, […] gewänne seinen
Anteil an der Deﬁnition des Realen zurück. Man begreift dann: das Schwebende ist
als Grundgebendes besonderer Art zu verstehen; das Hohle als eine Erfülltheit
eigenen Rechts neu zu beschreiben; das Fragile als Ort und Modus des Wirklichsten
zu bedenken; das Unwiederholbare gegenüber dem Seriellen als das höhere Phäno-
men zu erweisen.” (Sloterdijk, 2004: 39).
14 The same principle of co-isolation or co-immunism is present in Buckminster Fuller’s
architectural principle of construction called tensegrity (Sloterdijk, 2004: 472–473).
As the word itself indicates, a tensegrity refers to the integrity of structures that is
based on the equilibrium between the push and pull loads. The pulling forces are
absorbed by ﬂexible cables or tendons, whereas the pushing forces are absorbed by
bars or struts. Contrary to “classical” constructions, similar elements never touch one
another (isolation) and every element is necessary in order to hold the construction.
If one removes a single element, the construction collapses.
15 “No institution, […]—let alone an individual who reads on bravely—can imagine
that it is sufﬁciently open for everything that inﬁltrates, speaks and encounters it;
viewed from any point in our lifeworld, the vast majority of individuals, languages,
works of art, commodities and galaxies remain an unassimilable outside world, by
necessity and forever” (Sloterdijk, 2011: 76).
16 “Each house, as base for a ﬁnite capacity to live, generates exclusivity; each punctual
self-afﬁrmation produces ﬂaws in communication and negation of the Umwelt. This
is its afﬁrmative virtue, […].” (“Jede Wohnung, als Stützpunkt eines endlichen Leben-
Könnens, erzeugt Exklusivität; jede punktuelle Selbstbejahung produziert Kommu-
nikationsabbrüche und Umweltverneinung. Das ist ihre afﬁrmative Tugend, […]”,
Sloterdijk, 2004: 544).
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